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RECENT DECISION

New York's "Minor" Obscenity
Statute Held Constitutional
A seventeen year old youth, following
a prearranged plan, purchased two
"girlie" magazines from the defendant, a
cigar store proprietor, who was then arrested for violating Section 484-i of the
New York Penal Law which prohibits
the sale or delivery of pornographic
material to minors under the age of
eighteen. In affirming his conviction, the
Court of Appeals held that, although
scienter as to age was not an element of
the violation, the statute was neither a
limitation on the first amendment freedoms of speech and press nor unconstitutionally vague. People v. Tannenbaum,
18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966).
The first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. . . ..
,1 This does not mean,
however, that a citizen has an absolute
right to speak or publish whatever he
deems fit. 2 When the expression of a
1U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).

person is adversely prejudicial to the
public welfare, federal and state governments have the power to prohibit such

expression .3

In Roth v. United States,4 the United
States Supreme Court declared that
"obscenity" is not within the area protected by the constitutional guarantees of
free speech or press.5 The Court stated
that in determining obscenity the test was
"whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." 6
The term "contemporary
community
standards" has been construed to mean
not the standards of the particular local
Id. at 667. In Gitlow, writings which advocated, advised and taught the overthrowing
and overturning of organized government by
force, violence and unlawful means were found
to be inimical to the public welfare. In Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), it was
held that the wilful printing and circulation of
material advocating or encouraging the commission of a crime or the breach of the peace
to be adversely prejudicial to the public welfare. See also Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
4354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3

5ld. at 485.
61d. at 489.
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community from which the case arises,
but those of the nation as a whole. 7 The
Roth test has been qualified in that the
material must also be "patently offensive. ' 8 This means that the material
must be so offensive on its face, "as to
affront community standards of decency." 9
Aside from the material's "appeal to
prurient interest," another element of the
test-implied in Roth and specifically
stated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts 10
is that the material must also be "utterly
without redeeming social importance," 11
i.e., the material must be lewd for the
sake of being lewd, offensive for the sake
of being offensive.
A further refinement of the concept of
prurient interest was made in Mishkin v.
New York. 12 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, adopted the position
that the prurient appeal requirement is
satisfied if the dominant theme of the
material appeals to the prurient interest
of a clearly defined deviant sexual group
where such material is designed for and
primarily distributed to that group. 13
Ginzburg v. United States,1 4 a companion
case to Mishkin, added that, in close
cases,
where an exploitation of interests in
titillation by pornography isshown with
respect to material lending itself to such
exploitation through pervasive treatment or
_

7 Jacobellis

v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

8Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478 (1962).

9Id. at 482.
10 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
11Id. at 418.
12 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
1"Id.

14383

at 508.

U.S. 463 (1966).
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description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination
that the material is obscene even though
in other contexts the material would escape
15
such condemnation.
Thus the element of "pandering" was introduced, whereby consideration was given
to the business of disseminating materials
advertised to appeal to erotic interests.
It is important to note that, although a
state cannot define obscenity in terms
broader than those laid down by the
United States Supreme Court, a state,
of its own accord, may apply a definition
of obscenity narrower than that expressed
by the Court; it may voluntarily limit the
ambit of its control. Thus, New York,
in applying its statute controlling the
dissemination of obscene material to
adults, has defined obscenity as "hardcore pornography." 16

When the federal or state government
seeks to enact laws restricting freedom
of expression, the power of said governments to do so is limited by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, i.e., the standards embodied
in the legislation may not be unduly vague
or difficult of ascertainment. Thus, in
Winters v. New York, 17 the United States
Supreme Court held a New York obscenity statute "I unconstitutional on these
grounds. This statute's prohibition was
not limited to the indecent and obscene,
but, in addition, prohibited the publication of detective stories, criminal treatises
and stories of deeds of bloodshed when
15id. at 475-76.
16 Mishkin v. New York,

supra note 12, at

506, 508.
17333 U.S. 507 (1948).
18 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 925, § 1(2).

RECENT DECISIONS

so massed as to incite a person to violent
and depraved crimes even though such
a result was not intended by the publisher. 19
Turning from the general constitutional
limitations applicable to any statutory
regulation, a limitation unique to obscenity regulations is the requirement of
scienter of content. In Smith v. California,20 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a California ordinance
imposing criminal liability on any person
who had in his possession any obscene
or indecent publication in a place of
business where books are kept or sold.
The fundamental defect in the ordinance
was the lack of any requirement as to
knowledge on the part of the bookseller
of the book's contents. This operated, in
effect, to place strict liability upon the
bookseller and would have forced him to
restrict the books he sold to those he
inspected, resulting in a restriction not
only upon obscene matter, but also upon
the distribution of material constitutionally
protected. 2
The broad standards which the Supreme
Court has laid down as regards obscenity
have caused state governments much concern in the area of regulation of dissemination of material not obscene as to
adults, but unfit for minors. It has been
recognized that the authority of the state
over the activity of children is broader
22
than that over similar adult conduct.
In an attempt to exercise its authority
19Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
(1948).
20361 U.S. 147 (1959).
21 d. at 153-54.
22 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
(1944).

519

158

over the activity of children, New York
enacted former Section 484-h of the New
York Penal Law. 2 3 In People v. Bookcase, Inc.,24 appellants had been convicted
of violating former section 484-h. In
reversing the conviction, the Court of
Appeals held that that part of the statute
which read "any book . . . the cover or
content of which exploits, is devoted to,
or is principally made up of descriptions
of illicit sex or sexual immorality .. " 2
was so broad and obscure as to violate the
First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the due process clause
of the New York constitution.'
The
fact that the statute was applicable only
to minors had no bearing on the constitutional issue. The Court maintained
that, if the statute were to be given effect,
great works of literature would be deemed
illicit reading for the young, since anything
dealing with sex would come under the
prohibition of this statute regardless of
whether the material was fictional,
sociological or morally instructive in
nature.
Similarly, in People v. Kahan, 7 the
Court found the entire statute unconstitutional due to the vagueness of its substantive definitions.
In addition, the
Court believed the statute defective in
that it lacked a provision making scienter
of the content and of the age of the purchaser essential for conviction.
Judge
2 3 N.Y. Sess. Laws

1955, ch. 836, § 542.
14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1964).
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 836, § 542.
26 N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, § 6: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law."
27 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d
391 (1965) (per curiam).
24

13
Fuld, concurring, felt this type of regulation to be a constitutional exercise of the
state's authority.
He reasoned that,
although parental supervision of a child's
reading may be best, such parental control or guidance cannot always be provided, and society's transcendent interest
in protecting the welfare of children per2
mits that such authority be exercised .
Judge Fuld added, however, that the
definition of obscenity in such a statute
should be "reasonably precise so that
those who are governed by the law and
those that administer it will understand
its meaning and application." 29
As a result of former Section 484-h
of the New York Penal Law being held
unconstitutional, the New York legislature enacted two new sections-present
section 484-h, applicable to minors under
seventeen, and section 484-i, applicable
to minors under eighteen.
In Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick,30 the
New York Court of Appeals, in reviewing present section 484-h, held that a state
may constitutionally enact legislation
which differentiates the standards of
obscenity as to adults and minors.
The Court pointed out that when the
law is applied, a three-element definition
of what is "harmful to minors" is to be
used.
First, the material must predominantly appeal to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors; second,
it must be patently offensive to prevailing standards of what is suitable for
Id. at 312, 206 N.E.2d at 334, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 392 (concurring opinion).
291d. at 313, 206 N.E.2d at 335, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 393.
30 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d
28

947 (1966).
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minors; third, it must be utterly without
redeeming social importance.
In the principal case, the defendant
sold a seventeen year old a magazine entitled "Candid." The cover of the magazine exhibited a picture of a seductively
posed girl clad only in skimpy undergarments.
In addition to the pictorial
representation, the cover described the
contents, each article having a provocative title. The lower left hand comer
stated: "Sale to Minors Forbidden." The
magazine was devoted purely to sex,
featuring tales of sex orgies and pictures
of nudes. The advertisements contained
therein promoted mail-order photographs
and motion pictures of nudes, sexual devices and handbooks. In a prosecution
under 484-i, 484-h not being in issue
under the particular facts of the case,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the
magazine came within the restrictions imposed by the new section of the penal
law, which prohibits the sale of such
material to a person under the age
of eighteen, the vendor having knowledge
of its contents.3 1 Having so decided,
the Court turned its attention to the defendant's constitutional attacks upon the
statute.
Initially, it was contended that section
484-i is so vague that conviction under
the statute would deprive defendant of
due process of law. In rejecting this contention, the Court found that the material
subject to restriction is clearly defined.
Judge Keating, speaking for the majority, indicated that the obscenity stan31 People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268, 271,

220 N.E.2d 783, 785, 274 N.Y.S.2d

(1966).

131, 134
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dard under the various subdivisions proscribed material which was
'posed or presented in such a manner as
to exploit lust for commercial gain and
. . . which would appeal to the lust of
persons under the age of eighteen years
or to their curiosity as to sex or to the
the
between
differences
anatomical
sexes . ... 32
In analyzing this standard it was pointed out that a conviction under the statute
would not be based merely on the dissemination of material which appeals to
the minor's curiosity as to sex or to the
anatomical differences between the sexes.
In interpreting the language of the statute,
the provision was found to be primarily
aimed at pandering. Hence, in addition
to arousing the minor's curiosity, prohibited material must be posed or presented in such a manner as to exploit
lust for commercial gain. On the basis
of this construction of 484-i, it was felt
that the statute did not "spill over into
the area of constitutionally protected matter."

33

In further support of its construction,
the Court noted that the statute expressly
provided that obscenity is to be distinguished from "flat and factual statements of the facts, causes, functions or
purposes of the subject of the writing or
presentation, such as would be found in
bona fide medical or biological textbooks."

34

The purpose of such material

not being the exploitation of lust for commercial gain, the Court felt confident that
legitimate works of art, educational texts
Id. at 271, 220 N.E.2d at 786, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 135. (Emphasis added.)
33 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
32

and literature with redeeming social value
were not within the ban of section 484-i.
Countering appellant's contention that the
term "obscene" was indefinite and vague,
the Court held that the statute provided
a workable standard insofar as it gave
clear and unequivocal warning of the
5
conduct to be avoided, i.e., pandering.
A second constitutional objection raised
by the defendant was based upon an extension of the first amendment protection
of free speech and press. Relying on the
reasoning of Smith v. California, it was
contended that the failure to require proof
of scienter on behalf of the bookseller as
to the age of the purchaser would tend
to restrict the bookseller in the material
he would sell to persons whose membership in the eighteen and over age
bracket was questionable, and would, in
effect, be a state imposed restraint on
the sale of constitutionally protected literature. While recognizing that scienter of
content is a constitutional requirement of
any obscenity statute, the Court refused
to accede to the defendant's argument
that the rationale underlying the scienter
of content requirement in Smith v. California mandated a constitutional requirement of scienter as to age. 6
In so deciding, the Court distinguished
the situation presented in Smith from the
present case, finding a major difference
between
requiring the bookseller to read every
piece of material which he chooses to sell
and requiring him to inquire after and
at 272-73, 220 N.E.2d at 787, 274 N.Y.S.
2d at 135-36.
36 Id. at 273, 220 N.E.2d at 787, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 137.
35Id.

13
establish the age of those persons who
will fall within the doubtful age bracketY
The number of situations in which inquiry
would be necessary were considered to be
few in comparison to the total number of
purchasers.
The Court noted that the protections
granted by the first amendment are not
absolute, and, therefore, Section 484-i of
the Penal Law was to be viewed in light
of its "reasonableness in relation to the
legitimate end to be obtained." 38 Adopting such an approach, the Court found
that the imposition of strict liability as
to age did not cause the statute to unduly inhibit the free dissemination of
literature.
Judge Fuld, dissenting, believed that
the legislature could constitutionally restrict the distribution of certain materials
to minors, the distribution of which could
not be restricted as to adults, but thought
that a conviction could not be sustained
under Section 484-i of the Penal Law.39

Id. at 274, 220 N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 137.

37

Id. at 275, 220 N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 138.
See Fagan, Obscenity Control and
Minors-The Case for a Separate Standard,
38

10 CATHOLIc LAW. 270, 278 (1964), wherein
the author states:
The evidence of causal relationship between constant exposure of children to
obscene materials and moral degeneracy
and juvenile delinquency, even though
conflicting, can certainly justify a legislative decision to act in this area despite
the fact that it results in some curtailment of adult freedom of press.
39 t must be noted that while Judge Fuld dissented, he voted for the reversal of conviction
"with some reluctance." 18 N.Y.2d at 275, 220
N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 138 (dissenting
opinion).
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Judge Fuld considered the statute unconstitutional in that it was defective with
regard to its "substantive definition" and
its failure to require scienter as to age.
Inasmuch as section 484-i proscribes
the sale of material which appeals to the
curiosity of minors "as to sex or to the
anatomical differences between the sexes,"
minors being those "actually or apparently under the age of eighteen years,"
it was thought that such standards in
and of themselves were patently insufficient and impermissible predicates for
penal liability. Apart from the fact that
such standards would cover both married teenagers and children of tender
years, the statute was considered as indiscriminately punishing the dissemination of material which evoked a healthy
curiosity about sex. Taken literally, and
without the pandering provision, Judge
Fuld believed that the statute would outlaw instructive courses, such as sex and
hygiene education, and would bar a minor
from access to the paintings of the great
masters.
With regard to the pandering "limitation" of the statute, the dissent considered
the added requirement that the material
be "presented in such a manner as to
exploit lust for commercial gain," to be
of no saving value. Even if this was a
limitation, the statute was still too broad.
Relying upon the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Ginzburg, the dissent
pointed out that the intent of the seller,
or his presentation, "does not deprive publications or other works which are not
questionable of their constitutional protection." 40 It was further noted that the
401 d. at 276, 220 N.E.2d at 789, 274 N.Y.S.2d
at 139 (dissenting opinion).
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phrase "presented in such manner as to
exploit lust for commercial gain" was the
exact phrase which the Court held unconstitutionally vague in People v.
Kahan.4 1 Judge Fuld could not discover
any gain in precision by re-enactment.
Comparing Section 484-h and Section
484-i of the Penal Law, Judge Fuld noted
that section 484-h (1) (F) incorporated
a number of provisions designed to prevent unconstitutional application of the
law, which are not found in section 484-i.
Concluding that 484-i does not enable
vendors to know with any reasonable
degree of certainty exactly what material
is condemned, Judge Fuld found the statute to be unconstitutionally vague.
Among the safeguards of section 484-h
absent from section 484-i is the requirement of scienter of the bookseller as to
the age of the purchaser. 42
By this
provision, one who makes an honest mistake as to the purchaser's age has a complete defense to a prosecution under
section 484-h; under scction 484-i he is
strictly liable.
Taking the point of view opposite
to the majority's viewpoint on the issue,
the dissent thought the reason for requiring scienter of content was equally
valid for holding scienter as to age a
constitutional requirement of any criminal obscenity statute. Unlike the majority, the dissent intimated that it believed that instances of sale to persons
questionably over eighteen would be large
41

15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.
(1965) (per curiam).
It is to be

enough to severely restrict distribution of
material to adults, particularly in the
case of young women. Judge Fuld concluded that in its efforts to protect children, the state has infringed upon the
first amendment by hindering the free
flow of information and ideas. In answer
to the argument that, if scienter as to
age is a constitutional requirement it
should be read into the statute, Judge
Fuld noted that the language of section
484-i is manifestly too explicit and specific
to permit such a construction.
Judge Bergan, also dissenting, concurred
in the views expressed by Judge Fuld. In
addition, he attacked the statute on pragmatic grounds. It was thought that where
the prosecution had a choice between a
constitutionally sound statute (section 484h) and a defective statute (section 484-i)
the prosecution should rest on the sound
statute.13 To do otherwise would, it was
thought, create unnecessary litigation in
the federal courts, and leave the ultimate
decision on constitutionality in doubt.
In considering this statute in terms of
its constitutionality and the protection afforded the minor, one must take cognizance of the conditions extant in society
today. Many communities have experienced a growing concern over the moral
degeneration of the minor. It has been
suggested that an apparent connection exists between this degeneration and the
minor's reading of obscene material.44
In order to allay the fears of their citizens
many states have enacted legislation restricting the distribution of obscene ma-

2d 391

noted that the opinion of the Court in Kahan,
regardless of Judge Fuld's supposition, criticized
no specific language, but only found "definitional
defects" in the statute.
42 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h(1) (g) (ii).

43

Supra note 31, at 281, 220 N.E.2d at 792,
274 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (dissenting opinion).

44Fagan, supra note 38, at 274-78.

13
terials to minors.45 Section 484-h and
Section 484-i of the Penal Law are the
most recent efforts by New York to restrict the dissemination of pornographic
materials to minors. It is to be noted
that section 484-h, which is applicable
to minors under the age of seventeen, as
opposed to section 484-i, which applies to
minors under eighteen, requires scienter
of age before criminal prosecution. Section 484-i fails to include such a requirement. The legislature, in specifically omitting a requirement of scienter as to age
in section 484-i, enacted a statute which,
while apparently satisfying constitutional
standards, permeates the area with maximum regulation.
In this regard, the
legislature has implicitly recognized the
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necessity for effectively protecting the
youth of New York from obscene material.
This is an area of great controversy.
In the instant case, it appears that defendant Tannenbaum's violation of section 484-i resulted from a campaign conducted by Operation Yorkville, purposively to test the statute's constitutionality.
The New York Court of Appeals has sustained the constitutionality of section 484i. Nevertheless, the sharp dissent voiced
by Judge Fuld indicates the divergence
of opinion on this subject. It is probable
that the decision of the Court of Appeals
will not be allowed to stand unchallenged.
It is quite likely that the issue will find
its way to the Supreme Court for final
determination of its constitutionality.

45 Cf. Fagan, supra note 38.
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